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 THE SECURITY SERVICES IN SOUTH WALES
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
ALED EIRUG
Swansea
ABSTRACT
This article reveals the activity of British intelligence agents in south
Wales during the Great War and their involvement in the
surveillance of ‘subversive’ elements in the peace and labour
movements. It considers the shift in the security agencies’ prime
concern from German  counter- espionage to domestic  counter-
 subversion. Reports by local agents of MI5, the Ministry of
Munitions and the Admiralty are considered to assess  anti- war and
industrial militancy, and the government’s approach to the  anti- war
movement. It assesses the relationship between the aggressive
approach of the Glamorgan chief constable and MI5, and the Home
Office’s more cautious approach in the context of the centralizing of
authority over the security services and the diminution of local
police autonomy.
Whilst Wales responded largely with enthusiasm to the call to arms at the
beginning of the Great War, the country was also divided by endemic
industrial conflict and a strain of political dissent which undermined the
image of a country fully dedicated to the war effort. Whilst Francis and
Smith,1 and Mór O’Brien2 have highlighted the incidence of strikes and
 anti- war dissent in the South Wales Miners’ Federation (SWMF), others
1 Hywel Francis and Dai Smith, The Fed: A History of the South Wales Miners in
the Twentieth Century (London, 1980).
2 Anthony  Mór- O’Brien, ‘Patriotism on trial: the strike of the south Wales
miners, July 1915’, ante, 12, 1 (1984), 76–104.
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such as May3 and Doyle4 have emphasized the impact of  pro- war
jingoistic patriotism in Wales. This was exemplified by the Merthyr
Boroughs  by- election following Keir Hardie’s death in 1915 and the
victory of the former miner’s agent and  quasi- syndicalist, Charles Butt
Stanton, over the official Labour candidate, the moderate Independent
Labour Party (ILP) member and president of the SWMF, James
Winstone.5 However, there has been little consideration of the response
of the State to dissent and to the undermining of the war effort in south
Wales, with the notable exception of Hopkin’s study of Home Office
papers describing attempts by the Glamorgan Constabulary to persecute
key  anti- war activists such as T. E. Nicholas.6 This article lifts the veil on
the response of the British intelligence services in Wales during the First
World War, examines their concern for the region’s threatening cocktail
of industrial and social militancy, and it details their role in attempting to
frustrate pacifist and socialist  anti- war protest.7
The prime concern of the intelligence services during the first two
years of the war was to identify enemy agents and to monitor the
presence of ‘aliens’ in order to ensure they did not pose a threat to the
war effort. By 1916, however, they were also concerned by the growing
 anti- war movement which had developed as an alliance between
primarily  middle- class opponents of the war and those who believed that
military conscription would lead to industrial conscription. The rapid
expansion of the intelligence agencies’ activity from January 1916
onwards was an attempt to combat what was considered to be the
influence of a subversive combination of pacifism, socialism and
industrial militancy. MI5’s central registry already formed the basis of an
international network for gathering and exchanging intelligence, and it
supervised the creation of military security units throughout the
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3 Eddie May, ‘Charles Stanton and the limits to patriotic labour in south Wales’,
ante, 18, 3 (1997), 483–508.
4 Barry M. Doyle, ‘Who paid the price of patriotism? The funding of Charles
Stanton during the Merthyr Boroughs  by- election of 1915’, English Historical
Review, 109, 434 (1994), 1215–22.
5 Ivor Rees, ‘Charles Butt Stanton, 1873–1946’, National Library of Wales
Journal, 35, 3 (2010), 159–78.
6 Deian Hopkin, ‘Patriots and pacifists in Wales, 1914–1918: the case of Capt.
Lionel Lindsay and the Rev. T. E. Nicholas’, Llafur, 1, 3 (1974), 27–41.
7 Peter Catterall, ‘Introduction’, in Brock Milman, Managing Domestic Dissent in
First World War Britain (London, 2000), pp. ix, x; Francis and Smith, The Fed; K. O.
Morgan, Rebirth of a Nation (Oxford, 1980).
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dominions and colonies of the British Empire.8 However, as the German
threat from spies and espionage receded, the intelligence agencies  re-
 directed their zeal toward combating the enemy within.
The Defence of the Realm Act (1914) created ‘a  watered- down form
of martial law’, empowering the executive to bypass parliament and the
courts9 and, as the head of the Special Branch later admitted, ‘the police
had greater powers conferred upon them than they are ever likely to have
again’.10 The instruments of a corporate police state were rapidly
created, and the intelligence agencies became increasingly dedicated to
policing, monitoring and taking action against those who were claimed
to be undermining the war effort. The growth of the  still- secret security
arms of the state included the Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch and
the development of Military Intelligence 5 (MI5) as a  counter- subversive
organization.11 Between July 1914 and the end of the war, the military
unit working to locate German agents increased from fourteen men to
850, while the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police, which carried
out much of the frontline investigation of suspected subversion,
increased from 112 men of all ranks to 700. The two combined were
spending well over £20,000 per year.12
The security services used the justification of national security to
extend their intelligence gathering to protest groups and political
organizations, even if they posed no threat to the state. As MI5 explained
in 1917:
many actions of the public, in peace perfectly permissible, must, in time
of war, either be categorically prohibited or conditionally controlled by
regulation in the public interest. Such actions with or without evil intent,
may have a tendency to facilitate espionage, or to obstruct its prevention
or detection. It is, therefore, necessary to take  counter- active measures.13
Other government departments formed intelligence units to monitor
public attitudes and to engage in political surveillance, including the
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8 Nicholas Hiley,  ‘Counter- espionage and security in Great Britain during the
First World War’, English Historical Review, 101 (1986), 635–70.
9 Thurlow, The Secret State, p. 48.
10 Basil Thomson, ‘Scotland Yard and the war’, The Times, 16 November 1921.
11 ibid; Richard Thurlow, The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth
Century (London, 1994).
12 Hiley,  ‘Counter- espionage’, 395; Thurlow, The Secret State, p. 50.
13 Thurlow, The Secret State, p. 649.
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Admiralty, the Home Office, the Scottish Office, the Irish Office, the
 Postmaster- General, the  Registrar- General, the Ministry of Labour and
the Ministry of Munitions, which created its own labour intelligence
branch known as ‘Parliamentary Military Secretary 2’.14 Apart from its
unofficial registration of some 75,000 aliens, it now kept records of any
suspicious person; more than 38,000 personal dossiers were amassed in
the first three years of war alone, while its central registry kept a working
index of over a million cards for  cross- referencing suspicious people and
places.15 In the sixteen months from June 1916 to October 1917, MI5
investigated some 5,246 individuals solely because of their associations
with ‘pacifism,  anti- militarism etc.’ in a huge operation that covered most
of the British peace movement.16
From the summer of 1917 the security services concentrated on the
threat of ‘revolutionary tendencies’ in the labour force, while for Basil
Thomson, the head of Special Branch, the onset of conscription in 1916
meant that for the security services the three strands of pacifism,  anti-
 conscription and revolution were now ‘inseparably mixed’.17 This
broadening of the definition of  counter- espionage to include lawful
activities, and determined solely by civil servants, shifted the emphasis of
the intelligence services towards ‘the widespread investigation and
infiltration of political, industrial and pacifist organisations’.18
This plethora of intelligence agencies, and MI5’s increasing
involvement in  anti- subversive activity, provoked tensions with Special
Branch, and its Director, Basil Thomson, successfully argued in 1917
that due to the overlapping of agencies’ responsibilities, domestic
intelligence should be centralized in one body.19 Special Branch was
commissioned to send regular reports to the War Cabinet on pacifist and
revolutionary movements from October 1917 onwards20 and was made
solely responsible for domestic intelligence in 1918, while MI5 was
756 THE SECURITY SERVICES IN SOUTH WALES
14 Thurlow, The Secret State, p. 648; London, National Archives (hereafter
TNA), CAB 24/13 GT 733; C. J. Nottingham, ‘The state and revolution in Britain,
1916–1926’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Sheffield, 1985), p. 38.
15 TNA, INF 4/9, ‘The organisation of the services of military secrecy, security
and publicity’, October 1917, section III, pp.  iii- iv.
16 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm (London, 2009), p. 95.
17 Thomson, Queer People, p. 269.
18 Hiley,  ‘Counter- espionage’, 660.
19 Thomson, Queer People (London, 1922), p. 274.
20 TNA, War Cabinet minutes 245(20), 4 October1917, TNA 23/4, 64; NA,
CAB24/4/G173, report by Basil Thomson, 22 October 1917.
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limited to  counter- espionage and subversion within the armed forces
alone.21
A joint review of various pacifist groups by Special Branch and the
security services in July 1915 had convinced them erroneously that peace
groups were funded by ‘German money’ and that they were ‘capable of
any inhuman action as long as it would serve their own political ends’.22
The growth of the  anti- conscription movement in 1916 marked the
beginning of MI5’s concern about domestic subversion, and in June
1916 the main offices of the  No- Conscription Fellowship, the support
organization for conscientious objectors, and the National Council
Against Conscription (NCAC) in London, were raided by officers of
Special Branch by agreement with MI5. Over two tons of documents
and leaflets were confiscated23 and the MI5 officer who took the lead role
in investigating the  anti- conscription movement, Major Victor Ferguson,
reported that the operation had been mounted to counter ‘a dangerous
weapon whereby the loyalty of the people is being prostituted and the
discipline of the army interfered with’. He accused these organizations of
working up  anti- war sentiment and of being  pro- German.24
THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES – COVERT
ACTION IN SOUTH WALES
The impact of the  anti- war movement in Wales ‘led to much anxiety
within the Home Office and the domain of the intelligence services and
the Special Branch’,25 and the activities of the security services locally
reflected the government’s concern for the security of its strategically
important rail and port facilities, as well as the critical importance of
ensuring a constant supply of Welsh steam coal to supply the Navy.
Together with Clydeside and  north- west England, south Wales was
regarded as one of the most militant and troublesome areas of Britain in
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21 ‘Sir Basil Thomson’s reply to the Home Secretary’, The Times, 7 Nov 1921.
22 TNA, HO45/10782/278537/18c,  ‘Anti- war propaganda’ by J. O’Brien and P.
Quinn.
23 Hiley,  ‘Counter- espionage’, 651, 652.
24 TNA, HO45/10801/307402/file 75, report by Major Ferguson MI5(g), 14
June, 1916.
25 K. O. Morgan, Revolution to Devolution: Reflections on Welsh Democracy
(Cardiff, 2014), pp. 157–8.
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this period, and it was here (and in London) that the campaign against
conscription was at its most effective. The fear of industrial conscription
following the Military Service Act’s military conscription in January
1916 enabled the National Council against Conscription (later the
National Council for Civil Liberties) to penetrate the trade union
movement. Its organizer, Ivor Thomas from Briton Ferry, was also
Wales’s representative on the ILP’s Administrative Council and  anti- war
activists merged with the  anti- conscription movement in local trade
councils and trade unions to create an influential lobby.26
The increasing alarm of members of the War Cabinet was reflected by
the memorandum circulated by Lord Milner in August 1917 entitled
‘Labour in Revolt’, by Professor E. V. Arnold of the University College of
North Wales Bangor, which warned of dangers of serious conflict due to
the ‘angelic anarchy’ of opposition to conscription and support for the
Russian Revolution.27 His memorandum warned of the Marxist and
syndicalist influence in the south Wales coalfield, the Clyde shipyards
and in the Manchester and Sheffield districts:
‘Labour in Revolt’ is led by young men from 20 to 40 years of age. The
older trades union leaders hold entirely aloof from it and cannot under-
stand it. Nor can they resist it. The ideas of ‘Labour in Revolt’ are crude
enough, but the believers accept them with absolute sincerity. They are
identical with the theories of the Russian Revolution . . . The result of
the present war is entirely indifferent to its members; England is not
their country, and the war is not their war. Of the recently published
reports on ‘Industrial Unrest’ only the Report on Wales, recognized this
‘propaganda’ as a serious danger.
Arnold alleged that recruiting had been brought ‘almost to a standstill’,
and that the Munitions Acts had been made a  ‘dead- letter’ by a series of
strikes, or threats of strikes, throughout the country. He warned that this
group of men now wished to pursue the Labour Party conference’s
proposal ‘by which the International Proletariat will establish peace over
the heads of all Governments’, and he feared a strike where ‘the theorists
of South Wales have the game in their own hands’.28 His view was shared
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26 Carlisle, Cumbria Record Office, Catherine Marshall papers, D/MAR/4/95,
‘Report on the organisation of the NCCL in Wales, 1 July 1918’.
27 TNA, CAB 24/24 GT 1849, ‘Labour in revolt’.
28 ibid.
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by the intelligence departments active in Wales, including the police
forces, Special Branch and MI5, and the Ministry of Munitions and
Admiralty, whose local concern lay in ensuring the continuing supply of
steam coal for the Navy.29
Another government department that had intelligence officers based
in south Wales (in the Cardiff area) was the Ministry of Munitions’
intelligence department, PMS2 (the Parliamentary Military Secretary
Department, number 2 section). In February 1916, Lloyd George, then
Minister for Munitions, approved the creation of an intelligence service
in his ministry, whose initial role was to protect munitions factories from
espionage and sabotage and to scrutinize aliens seeking munitions
work.30 Vernon Kell provided the Ministry with a nucleus of MI5 officers
under the command of Lt Col Frank Labouchere, although by
December 1916 the Ministry of Munitions had also commissioned Basil
Thomson’s Special Branch to undertake the intelligence service on
labour matters for the whole country, which they did by deploying agents
and local police forces.31 Throughout 1916 Labouchere set about
expanding his aliens’ unit into a national intelligence organization, and
by November of that year he had added a second branch to handle
intelligence on labour unrest.32 He spent a substantial amount of money
in recruiting ‘a host of private agents’ to report on local unrest.33
Thomson’s secret ambition to incorporate all of the disparate sections
involved in civil intelligence into the Special Branch was bolstered by the
involvement of PMS2 officers as agents provocateurs in a murder plot
against Lloyd George that eventually led to the closure of the
organization. Even though the case led to successful convictions against
three people for conspiracy to murder the prime minister and other
Cabinet members, their embarrassing involvement compelled Addison,
the Minister for Munitions, to close the section, and their role was
transferred to MI5 in April 1917.34
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29 Stephen Twigge, Edward Hampshire and Graham Macklin (eds), British
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30 Hansard, HC, Vol 94, 12 June 1917, cols 752–3.
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32 Thomson, Queer People, p. 269.
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p. 409
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PMS2 was organized into four areas of Great Britain. These were: a
Scotland and northern England section, headquartered in Glasgow; a
second area covering Yorkshire, Lancashire and the north Midlands,
headquartered in Leeds; a third area covering London and the south
Midlands, with its headquarters in London; and a fourth covering south
Wales and the west of England, with its headquarters in Cardiff.35 The
Cardiff office included at least three officers, including a ‘Mr. A. Barker’,
who was the ‘Investigating Officer’ for Wales, assisted by a ‘Mr.
Callaghan’ who worked for him. Unlike some officers in other districts,
both lived in the area, and a third officer was identified in the security
service files as William Faulkner.36 These  locally- based officers reported
on the state of labour relations in the coal, docks and rail industries and
they monitored and analysed the attitudes of the trade unions and the
influence of  anti- war organizations, such as the ILP. Those reports that
have come to light provide a fascinating insight into the social and
political conditions of the time, and of the seriousness with which the
security services regarded the  anti- war and  anti- capitalist tendency of
activists in the labour movement.
From at least the late summer of 1916, these officers submitted
reports to PMS2 in the Ministry of Munitions which were circulated to
MI5. One revealing report, dated 30 August 1916, written by Barker,
described attitudes and the state of morale in the labour movement in
Merthyr Tydfil and the influence of the local  anti- war movement. He
stated that although individual miners showed no wish to ‘hamper
Imperial efforts’, nowhere else in the mining industry had the agent
encountered such distrust between coal owners and their employees. He
found that ‘tacked on’ to the trades unions’ organization were
‘combinations’ such as ‘a Council for Civil Liberties, a Council for Peace
and the like’. He warned that although the objective of these
organizations was no secret, ‘they are slowly but surely bringing about an
attitude which to a certain extent is bound to become prejudicial to
major interests’. He highlighted the failure of prominent local figures,
including Labour MPs, to support the war effort and to ‘help the average
man to keep in the right frame of mind’:
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At the moment, Socialists with whom the ILP is identified, and a section
of the Welsh clergy, are out to either mould new ideas or disturb fixed
ones, and thus divert essential enthusiasm. I do not think that very much
assistance need be expected from Labour members inWales; it seems to
me they are the slaves of local dictation.
He identified local ‘juveniles’ as slackers and troublemakers, but the
tendency for shopkeepers and merchants to raise prices and the
increasing cost of living caused ‘considerable irritation’. While miners
were not so badly affected because of their increasing wages, railwaymen,
municipal employees, shop assistants and others could not keep pace. He
warned that ‘the agitators are out to engineer difficulties’ and referred to
the representation of 116 representatives of trade unions, together with
political and religious organizations at a recent meeting of the National
Council for Civil Liberties in the area.37
PMS2’s close interest in labour disputes and trade union activity is
reflected in its active and  well- informed reporting and monitoring of the
crisis in the rail industry following the threat of railway unions in south
Wales to strike for an increase in wages from 17 September 1916. The
Admiralty and the Home Office pressed for swift preventative action,
including either invoking the Defence of the Realm Act or deploying the
military, but in a crisis meeting of government departments on 15
September, the Minister of Munitions, Christopher Addison, and the
Labour Cabinet Minister Arthur Henderson, insisted on a more
conciliatory approach. That afternoon, J. H. (Jimmy) Thomas, the
General Secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen, was persuaded
reluctantly by Addison to visit south Wales to dissuade the local unions
from taking strike action: ‘Thomas for the NUR shuffled and wriggled
rather; but he was finally bound to agree to go down to South Wales to
prevent any premature stoppage . . . The result of the whole performance
is that an agreement has now been arrived at for an immediate advance
of 5/-.’38
Two reports of meetings of railway workers on the following Sunday,
17 September 1916, were submitted by the agent identified as
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Callaghan. Labouchere was warned of collusion between rail workers
and the tippers at Cardiff Docks, and of attempts by ILP members in
Neath and Bedlinog to press for an immediate strike. He reported that at
the first meeting on 17 September, the south Wales district council of the
Amalgamated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen instructed
the Executive Committee of the union not to accept less than ten
shillings per week advance in wages and that in the event of an
unsatisfactory settlement a conference should be convened.
The strike was averted in the second meeting that afternoon in the
Park Hall, Cardiff. Jimmy Thomas addressed a large meeting of railway
employees from all parts of the south Wales district and ‘most earnestly’
appealed to the men to withdraw their previous decision to cease work at
midnight that evening. A further note by Callaghan reported that he had
‘kept closely with the Military in this matter’ and reported that the
meeting of railway men and delegates representing south Wales, held at
the Park Hall, Cardiff the following Sunday was ‘moderate but with a
strong undercurrent of resolve’. He agreed to press for the lower increase
of five shillings, which was agreed by the employers.39
One of the most intriguing covert interventions by the intelligence
services in south Wales was the involvement of PMS2 in developing the
political and policing response towards the  anti- war and  anti-
 conscription movement and the efforts to contain the level of discontent
in the region between November 1916 and the autumn of 1917. This
period witnessed the violent breaking up of a major  anti- conscription
meeting in Cardiff ’s Cory Hall in November 1916, and included the
commissioning and publication of the Report of the Commission of
Enquiry into Industrial Unrest. It culminated in the ballot on a  comb-
 out of miners from south Wales collieries in November 1917. Their
constant monitoring and reporting reflected the government’s fear of and
nervousness about the  anti- war movement, and of industrial militancy in
key industries such as rail and coal. In this period, PMS2 actively worked
to stem the level of discontent towards conscription and the growing
influence of the peace movement in south Wales.
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THE CORY HALL DISTURBANCE
The  large- scale  anti- conscription meeting held at Cardiff’s Cory Hall on
7 November 1916, which was disrupted by its opponents, displayed the
innate conflict in south Wales between the  anti- war movement and  pro-
 war organizations. It was the subject of intense scrutiny by the
intelligence agencies, working closely with the local police forces.40 The
flurry of political activity before the disturbance and the illuminating
discussions between Lloyd George’s closest advisers and the  second- in-
 command in PSM2 signify the seriousness with which they recognized
the threat of  anti- war activity.
Four days prior to the Cory Hall disturbance, one of Labouchere’s
staff, Major William Lauriston Melville Lee, the author of A History of
the Police in England, and who served as the ministry’s investigating
officer for the London District and the Midlands,41 met Major David
Davies, Lloyd George’s private secretary, to discuss the political and
industrial situation in south Wales. He offered to help ‘with all the means
in his power’ and arranged for Lloyd George to send a message of
support to the ‘patriotic’ meeting convened on the eve of the Cory Hall
meeting in order to oppose the  anti- conscription meeting.42 His report
noted Davies and Lee’s agreement to create a  pro- war campaign in
Wales and to counter  anti- war propaganda. Davies advised Lee to get in
touch with a number of influential Welsh figures, including Professor
Tom Jones, at the time the secretary of the Welsh Insurance Committee
as well as editor of Welsh Outlook,43 and Edgar Chappell (who had
previously also served as the magazine’s editor), who he described as an
authority on housing and ‘kindred social subjects’, although it was noted
that Chappell was probably a pacifist. He also suggested Silyn Roberts,
secretary of the Welsh Appointments Board. These men, he was advised,
could tell him ‘who can be depended upon and who to avoid’.
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Lee’s note of the meeting with Davies emphasized that the tone of the
campaign should make it clear from the start that it was not ‘being run in
the capitalist interest’. They discussed the opportunities for  pro- war
propaganda in showing the new film of the Battle of the Somme, and
discussed likely speakers. Davies suggested the name of the owner of
Standard Colliery, Sir W. J. Thomas of Ynyshir as chairman of the
campaign; the latter was said to be ‘no speaker’ but he was one of the
most respected men in Wales. Other names mentioned by Davies as
likely speakers were the general secretary of the SWMF, Tom Richards,
and the prominent district agent and member of the SWMF executive,
Alfred Onions. He also suggested the name of Joseph Davies as a
knowledgeable statistician of the coal trade as a useful source of
information.
Two days later, on 9 November 1916, Lee met Thomas Jones and
reported Jones’s view to Labouchere that ‘the only wise line of action to
be pursued for the present is the educational, or . . . an effort to counter
bad propaganda by better’. Jones spoke ‘very highly’ of Edgar Chappell,
who he described ‘as a three star man for our present purposes’, but he
warned against trusting a number of others whom he described as being
in ‘David Davies’s pocket’. These names included the editor of the
Western Mail, Willie Davies. Jones also gave information to Lee about
George Davison,44 a prominent wealthy benefactor of the labour
movement in Ammanford and  north- west Wales, who he described as a
‘fundamental anarchist’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘quite irreconcilable’, although
he was a personal friend and for whom otherwise he had a great deal of
respect.
Jones highlighted what he thought was the fundamental loss of
authority by the older generation of miners’ leaders in the south Wales
coalfield and he blamed Davison’s influence:
a very large number of younger men are coming forward (largely
educated by Davison) who are up to all the points in the game, students
of the money market, readers of Marx, and keen and able controversial-
ists. These men wield the real power in the S. Wales Coalfields.45
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Jones described two activists in particular, namely Nun Francis of
Ammanford (presumably Nun Nicholas),46 who he described as a ‘clever
and determined stormy petrel’, and the second was Noah Ablett,47
probably the most influential activist, but he also dismissed him as a ‘low
type of man and a drunkard’. In his note of the meeting, Lee noted
Jones’s view that it was of ‘prime importance’ that the government
should give a clear lead to public opinion on such subjects as food prices,
profiteering, coal for the Navy, domestic consumption of coal, gambling
in shipping, and that mine owners, shipowners and colliers should be
made to understand what sacrifices were demanded from them and on
what grounds. Jones warned against attempting to ‘bamboozle the
miners’ because ‘they know too much’, and that any such attempt would
rebound disastrously on the whole situation. He warned that a policy of
drift towards the mining industry would lead to certain trouble and also
warned against taking police action against the  anti- war minority and
parliamentary leaders of the ILP.
Jones argued that The Times should be encouraged to create a ‘special
commission’ to study the industrial situation in south Wales, and to write
a series of explanatory articles on the real situation in the Cardiff and
Rhondda districts. These articles, he said, would have to treat
shipowners, coal owners and colliers equitably. An effort should be made
to increase miners’ awareness of the importance of steam coal to the
Navy and that with this object in mind, he believed Sir John Jellicoe
would be willing to send a message to the colliers urging them not to
desert their naval comrades.48 A series of four feature articles written by a
‘special correspondent’, along the lines suggested by Jones, appeared in
The Times between 20 and 24 November 1916.49 The lead editorial
column of the paper addressed the danger of a strike in the coal industry
in south Wales and warned against  ‘pro- German agitators’. It accused
the miners of taking the war too lightly and spoke of them as living in
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‘valleys that are too sheltered and remote’ to permit any sense of danger
or disaster’. Furthermore, it called on the government to intervene in the
dispute over wages that threatened to paralyse the coalfield and to take
‘prompt coercive action’.50
Within a month Jones was made assistant secretary to the Cabinet and
he and Davies became part of the key group of officials that surrounded
Lloyd George as prime minister from 7 December 1916 onwards. The
coal industry in south Wales had already been brought under
government control on 1 December 1916, and the government was
concerned by the increasingly militant mood of the labour movement,
especially in the mining industry, as 1917 wore on.51
The  break- up of the Cory Hall  anti- conscription meeting in Cardiff
has been granted particular significance by Millman, who describes the
‘Battle of Cory Hall’ as exemplifying an ‘unbridgeable  patriot- pacifist
chasm’, in which elements of the working class responded to the war in
radically different ways.52 The meeting was held by the National Council
for Civil Liberties on 11 November 1916 and the main speakers
scheduled for the meeting were Ramsay Macdonald MP, the
railwaymen’s leader Jimmy Thomas, and the president of the SWMF,
James Winstone. But  pro- war protests’ led by C. B.Stanton, MP for
Merthyr Boroughs, Captain Tupper of the Seamen’s Union, and
organized by a Captain Atherley Jones, secretary of the  pro- war British
Empire Union, and a recognized  ‘rabble- rouser’,53 resulted in the
meeting’s  break- up and its subsequent  re- scheduling to Merthyr Tydfil a
month later.
All three PMS2 officers were closely involved in monitoring and
reporting on the Cory Hall meeting. MI5’s Director, Vernon Kell,
advised against banning the Cory Hall meeting, and whilst he believed
that south Wales was ‘a hotbed of peace cranks’ and the subject matter
for the conference included industrial conscription, the invasion of
personal liberty and the maladministration of the Military Service Acts,
it was impossible to judge beforehand whether the Defence of the Realm
regulations would be contravened. Therefore, he recommended to the
Home Office that the meeting be allowed to continue but that reports of
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it should be made. Ominously, however, Kell also suggested strongly that
the request of the National Council for Civil Liberties for police
protection should be refused:
I understand they have asked for police protection for the meeting so
that would raise a question whether it is in the public interest to allow
meetings which may lead to a disturbance of the peace, at a time when
the police force is depleted and military forces are required to defeat the
King’s enemies.54
The subsequent violent breaking up of the Cory Hall meeting was
witnessed by PMS2 agents, and in spite of MI5’s caution, one of PMS2’s
agents was involved in planning to disrupt the meeting.55 Barker was
present in a meeting at the Park Hotel at Cardiff on 2 November 1916
that was convened by Captain Atherley Jones to organize the disruption
of the Cory Hall meeting. There were  twenty- five other people present,
including Cardiff businessmen and a military officer (a second lieutenant
in uniform).
In a note dated Monday 13 November 1916, William Faulkner
reported that on the day after the disruption of the Cory Hall meeting
the south Wales ILP branches held a private conference of delegates
there and were addressed by Ramsay Macdonald. Faulkner failed to
enter the meeting of about 200 delegates, but he succeeded in speaking
to a number of the members that evening. He reported that the ILPers
were ‘exceedingly wild at this latest example of ‘British Prussianism’. He
was obviously trusted sufficiently to converse with one of the ILP’s
prominent members and public speakers, Mrs Swanwick, who told him
that Lloyd George was thought to be the man behind the ‘patriots’ of
Cardiff and that he had wanted a row in Cardiff to provide him with an
excuse for prohibiting peace meetings. He reported that arrangements
were being made for the National Council for Civil Liberties conference
to be held in Merthyr in December and that the  pro- war faction that had
disrupted the Cory Hall meeting was keen to ‘organise for a real fight at
Merthyr’:
Both sides talk of getting a crowd of miners who will fight in real earnest
if necessary. In fact it may lead to a riot if the conference is not prohib-
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ited. I have come here today to ascertain the feeling in Merthyr. I think
the meeting should be prohibited but perhaps I can form a better
opinion after a talk with the ILPers here tonight.56
Callaghan provided a more sober and cautious analysis of the
implications of the disruption of the Cory Hall meeting, and in doing so
gave a revealing assessment of the  anti- war movement in south Wales.
Entitled ‘Assessment of the peace meeting in the Cory Hall’ and written
on the day after the Cory Hall meeting, he warned of the dangers of
underestimating the influence of the peace movement on the labour
movement:
It would be a mistake to overlook the character of the peace gathering
itself. The very grades of people which were markedly absent from
Stanton’s  anti- peace meeting of the previous night were in large atten-
dance here. Miners, railwaymen and other workers warmly greeted
Macdonald, Thomas and Winstone. It is said that 417 peace delegates
were present, and I am personally aware that the latter almost filled the
body of the Hall which was reserved for them. Were it not for the part
played by Stanton and Tupper the peace meeting would have been a
comparative success; it was as well attended as the protest meeting of the
previous night.
I regret that from observations I cannot conclude that the work of
Stanton, Tupper and Atherley Jones is likely to have a permanent effect.
The peace forces are well organised and it is to be hoped that they will
not turn more attention to the undermining of the industrial situation. I
regard the attitude of Winstone, Macdonald and especially Thomas as
dangerous to the future peace of labour in this area. I doubt if Stanton
and Tupper can be placed in the balance against men like Thomas and
Winstone who influentially represent railways and miners respectively. I
think Cardiff should be regarded as only a starting off point, and it is up
to some organisation to carry opposition into the real strongholds of the
ILP, and other places where agitators have had full sway in their schemes
of hostility towards the government and the conduct of the war, and of
course the poisoning of the minds of the workers.57
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A further note, dated 17 November 1916, sent by Barker to Labouchere
and forwarded to MI5 and the War Office, suggested that if the  re-
 arranged Cory Hall meeting was allowed to proceed, ‘loyal’  pro- war
meetings should be held in other towns in the region (such as
Pontypridd, Aberdare, Mountain Ash and Swansea) at the same time,
but he warned that arranging such a meeting in Merthyr would be
fraught with difficulty:
I do not think it would be altogether wise to arrange a meeting in
Merthyr which is the most difficult place we have to deal with. The
strictly loyal section of this town, namely professional men, shopkeepers,
and such like, are largely dependent in their businesses on the direct
support of the ILP and socialist factions, and therefore cannot be very
well organised as an  out- and- out serious opposition.
Barker noted that a verbatim transcript of the Cory Hall meeting had
been taken by E. Ellis Hughes, the chief reporter of the Western Mail, and
sent on to PMS2 by Colonel Aspinall Turner, the military commanding
officer for the Cardiff and Barry garrison.58 Barker also sent a number of
notes to Labouchere reporting the opposition of certain trade union
lodges and trades councils to the conference that was to be held on 9
December, and he warned that Stanton was ‘endeavouring to organise a
strong opposition at Aberdare and Mountain Ash to the peace meeting’.
He informed PMS2 that Captain Atherley Jones had said he would hold
protests against the conference and that the police’s attitude towards the
conference should be to allow it to take place:
the competent military authority of Merthyr has, I understand, been
communicated with on the matter, and his decision is to leave the ques-
tion to the police. After a review of the situation and the present labour
feeling in Merthyr, I am of the opinion that it would be unwise to allow
the counter demonstration to take place, and I suggest that the diplo-
matic course to pursue would be to allow the peace conference to take
place and let the local CMA [Competent Military Authority] send for
Atherley Jones and let it be hinted to him that if he really wants to do
anything no objections would be offered to his organizing meetings at
Pontypridd, Mountain Ash, Aberdare and Swansea, on or about the
same date as the Merthyr conference.59
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Callaghan went further, warning that violence would result if any
attempt was made to prohibit the meeting and that even  pro- war
meetings should be prohibited:
The ILP and associated bodies have decided to go forward at all costs,
and this decision is being endorsed by large number of miners and other
workers. I have been advised that the use of revolvers is being spoken of
should Stanton, [Atherley] Jones, or other individuals attempt active
organised opposition. It would be most deplorable if this Merthyr affair
were to resolve itself into a bloody riot as there is positive danger that
thereafter it would assume more serious proportions in industrial direc-
tions. I think that opposition meetings at any of the surrounding centres,
if it to be held on the 9th idem should be prohibited.60
He warned that the  anti- war element in the Merthyr area was well
organized by the younger miners:
I must say that the organisations in this part are well directed. A miner
informed me that ILP men were capturing any vacant offices in their
lodges, and that even when it came to a vote the ILP were scoring.61
The meeting in the Rink in Merthyr Tydfil on 9 December 1916 went
ahead without interruption and, seemingly, the advice given by MI5 and
PMS2 was heeded.62 No meetings were held to oppose the  re- convened
conference, apart from one mass meeting held locally two days
beforehand, and a special ‘Union Jack’ train to carry ‘patriotic’ protestors
was prohibited from running from Cardiff to Merthyr on the day.63
The more sober assessment by the intelligence services of the events
surrounding disruption of the peace meeting in the Cory Hall
highlighted the strength and potential of the  anti- war movement rather
than the success of the ‘patriots’ in disrupting the conference. The crowd
of over 2,500 people in Merthyr was drawn from all parts of south Wales
and included individuals from as far as London and the English
midlands. In comparison with the Cory Hall conference, there was an
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increase of 25 per cent in registered delegates, from 445 to 593,
representing an aggregate membership of peace and labour organizations
of 324,767, as against the 445 delegates representing 220,000 people at
Cardiff.64 The meeting drew together a wide  cross- section of opinion
that went beyond the  anti- war movement and it included those opposed
to the further encroachment of the state in extending conscription. The
spirit of Merthyr was possibly more militant than that of Cardiff, and the
breaking up of the Cory Hall meeting was said to have steeled the
Merthyr delegates to display an impressive unity of purpose.65 Another
intelligent agent, William Randall, who worked for the Admiralty in
south Wales, sought to criticize the  pro- war protestors as  ‘ill- contrived
and  ill- controlled “patriotic” movements - the effects arising from the
incitement of mob law and the studied inactivity of the police, thus
encouraging mob law’.66 His view suggests that palpable tension existed
between the local police force, who were instrumental in allowing
protestors led by Stanton and Tupper to use violence to disrupt the
meeting, and MI5, which was disturbed by the implications of these
scenes of mob rule.
Another task accomplished by PSM2’s officers was to draw up a list of
the key persons who were believed to be connected with the labour and
peace movements in south Wales. This list was mainly compiled by
Barker as the senior officer locally, and he provided an analysis of the
character, political leaning and influence of those individuals who were
considered to be significant in the labour and peace movements. The list,
entitled ‘Alphabetical List of Names of Persons connected with Labour
and Peace movements in South Wales’, was issued internally among
members of the security services and provides an insight into PMS2’s
concerns about the threat to the war effort in the region at the time, as
well as its assessment of the strength of the  anti- war movement. It
contains 184 names of people who were active in the labour and peace
movements at the time.67 While the list deals mainly with those in the
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labour movement and beyond who were considered to be opposed to the
war, it is significant that the ‘Labour and Peace movements’ were
conflated and a socialist outlook was invariably interpreted as being
synonymous with an  anti- war standpoint. For example, Joseph Branch,68
a Dockers’ Union agent in Briton Ferry, was described as a member of
the No Conscription Fellowship (NCF) and the Union of Democratic
Control (UDC), and had been convicted for distributing  anti- war
literature. J. E. Edmunds,69 a teacher in Cardiff , the secretary of the
Cardiff Trades and Labour Council and Labour candidate in the 1918
general election, was described as ‘extreme’. Matt Lewis of Aberdare,
another teacher, local secretary of the ILP and a close friend of Keir
Hardie, was considered to be a ‘dangerous’  anti- conscriptionist.
The list also included three activists who opposed the  anti- war
movement, including: T. Bubb of the British Empire Union, described as
a ‘paid  anti- socialist’ and ‘all bubble’ and having ‘no influence’; Matt de
Lacy, who was described as  anti- socialist and a supporter of the
government; and G. Jackson, secretary of the Seamen’s Union in
Newport, who was under the influence of the National Union of
Seamen’s leader, Captain Tupper. The list also included the more
traditional prominent figures in the SWMF, such as: William Abraham
(‘Mabon’), described as an ‘advocate of fairly liberal views’; Bernard (sic)
Hartshorn, described as ‘a writer and propagandist of fair repute’, with
considerable influence who was able to sway the SWMF’s executive
committee on vital questions and thought of as ‘advanced’; and Frank
Hodges, the miners’ agent for the Garw Valley, described as ‘closely
associated with the advanced labour propaganda’.
It also featured a number of  well- known British politicians and
propagandists who were regular speakers at  anti- war rallies across south
Wales.70 These included: Clifford Allen,71 originally from Newport, and
the first chairman of the NCF; William Ayles, from Bristol and a
member of the NCF’s executive; Charles Buxton, a strong pacifist and
leading member of the UDC and the ILP;  Langdon- Davies, secretary of
the NCCL; Ramsay Macdonald MP, described as a ‘dangerous
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influence’; E. D. Morel, the founder of the UDC and ‘dangerous on
general lines’; and Philip Snowden, considered as  anti- war and
‘exercising pernicious influence in labour circles’. One figure who was
certainly not  anti- war but who opposed conscription and joined protests
in south Wales against the dangers of conscription in the work place was
the railwaymen’s leader, Jimmy H. Thomas, who was described as one
who ‘dabbles in peace organizations. Should not be interfered with in any
circumstances. Incline to be moderate but easily made hostile.’ The
SWMF’s President, James Winstone,72 was identified as a ‘Pacifist’ and
allied to the ILP. He had presided at the Merthyr peace meeting that had
been held the previous day and although he may have baulked at being
described as a pacifist at this stage of the war, he was described as a
‘waverer’ and easily influenced by ‘extremists’.
The main body of names on the list are those active in the ILP, trade
unions and the trades councils who were considered as ‘doubtful’,
‘extreme’, held ‘strong views’ (that is, against the war), ‘agitators’,
‘militant’, ‘undesirable’, ‘dangerous’ or held ‘advanced’ views. These
appellations covered the majority of those on the list.73
POLICING
Although government departments such as the Admiralty and the
Ministry of Munitions had intelligence operations throughout the
country, it was the police forces, working closely with them and with
Special Branch, who undertook local intelligence gathering and
monitoring of  anti- war and labour activists. As  anti- war activity grew
from 1916 onwards, so the level of police and security services’ activity
also increased and the anxiety displayed by the government and the
security services was amplified by the aggressive and bellicose approach
of the police in Glamorgan, and by the combative and uncompromising
attitude of its energetic chief constable, Captain Lionel Lindsay. Lindsay
has been described as the ‘apotheosis of the atmosphere of conflict
between police and labour in twentieth century South Wales’.74 His
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background in Ireland and his colonial military training in the 1880s
gave him ‘a quite incredible ignorance of and insensitivity towards the
population he was trying to serve’,75 and the Marxist historian of the
south Wales miners, Page Arnot, described Lindsay’s period in the
British Army in Egypt as a preparatory crusade against those who
propagated class war.76
Lindsay regarded himself as the ally of the employers and coalowners.
As chief constable of Glamorgan between 1891 and 1936, in a period
when county chief constables were known to be ‘notoriously militaristic
and autocratic’, Lindsay was ‘in a class of his own’ and he viewed the
population of the Welsh mining valleys with the same suspicion with
which he viewed the population of his native Ireland.77 The autocratic
executive powers of chief constables like Lindsay in county areas with
large industrial populations like Glamorgan had grown throughout his
period as chief constable, but the requirements of war and a centralized
intelligence service commandeered by the Special Branch under Basil
Thomson reduced Lindsay’s autonomy, thereby changing the dynamic
of the relationship between chief constables, the military and Scotland
Yard, so that the local competent military authority, MI5, the Director of
Public Prosecutions or the Home Office were able to  over- ride the
authority of chief constables to authorize prosecutions in their localities.
Against Lindsay’s wishes, the Home Office was increasingly reluctant to
prosecute  anti- war activists during the war.78
The Home Office, assisted by other government departments and the
local police, adopted a variety of indirect methods to curb pacifist
propaganda. In south Wales, as elsewhere, hall proprietors were
encouraged to refuse bookings from  anti- war organizations, while leaflets
and  anti- war propaganda were seized in raids on the homes and offices of
members of the ILP, UDC and NCF members.79 However, the  over-
 enthusiasm of the local police in Glamorgan disturbed the central
intelligence agencies. The impact of raids by the police and the military
to seize literature in the summer of 1916 were said to be ‘all very well up
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to a certain point’, but they drove ‘the propaganda to seek better cover,
and make it more difficult to cope with the trouble. The ILP and UDC
are secretly very active.’ 80
Legal opinion in the Home Office advised local police authorities to
err on the side of caution and believed that prosecutions for seditious
speeches were ‘seldom advisable’.81 Until the middle of 1916
prosecutions were initiated by the local competent military authority,
usually the commanding officer of the local military barracks. This
arrangement in south Wales was characterized by ready cooperation
between Lindsay and the two local military commanding officers,
Colonel Edwards Vaughan at Swansea and Colonel Schofield at Cardiff.
Between April 1915 and December 1916, Lindsay submitted forty cases
for prosecutions of  anti- war activists in Glamorgan to the competent
military authority, involving  fifty- two individuals on the basis of offences
under the Defence of the Realm Act, which included spreading
disloyalty, making disloyal speeches and distributing pamphlets. In that
period the competent military authority only refused to authorize
prosecutions in three cases.82
Fifteen of the prosecuted cases were against those who had spoken
against the war in conversation, but they also included serious cases such
as the successful prosecution of the leader of the Irish Citizen’s Army,
Captain Jack White, who travelled from Ireland in May 1916 to agitate
for a strike in the coalfield against the execution of the leaders of the
Easter Rising; he was imprisoned for three months.83 Another nineteen
individuals were prosecuted for distributing  anti- war pamphlets,
including ten members of Briton Ferry’s ILP branch. The three
unsuccessful cases submitted for prosecution reinforced the approach of
the Home Office and the military that caution should be displayed in
dealing with displays of dissent, especially in relation to the press. All
three cases arose from the coverage of speeches made at Keir Hardie’s
funeral in 1915. Two related to newspapers,84 while the third case was
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against the Revd T. E. Nicholas, following his fiery  anti- war oration at
Keir Hardie’s funeral. Lindsay, who kept up a relentless but unsuccessful
pursuit of Nicholas throughout the war, claimed this refusal to prosecute
was ‘for sentimental reasons’.85
Lindsay’s growing frustration was compounded by a further ten cases
he submitted to the Competent Military Authority, who from June 1916
passed on such requests for prosecution to ‘higher authorities’, either the
Home Office or the Director of Public Prosecutions. These were
primarily reports of speeches by visiting  anti- war activists such as
Bertrand Russell, the leading ILPers, Mr and Mrs Philip Snowden, and
Ramsay Macdonald MP. Only in the case of a speech by Robert
Williams, the secretary of the National Transport Workers’ Federation,
was prosecution recommended, but it was subsequently dropped
because of difficulty in providing legal assistance. In the case of a
submission for prosecution regarding a pamphlet, Lindsay reported that
while the pamphlet was recognized as ‘objectionable’, and the
Competent Military Authority had recommended prosecution, the
Director of Public Prosecutions considered it a weak case.86 He reported
that the police carried out raids at the request of MI5 on the homes of
two secretaries of the NCF, in the Swansea Valley and Gorseinon, who
were subsequently fined for distributing leaflets. These were seized and
destroyed.87
In the ten month period from the beginning of January 1917 to the
end of October 1917, Lindsay listed submissions for prosecution for
 forty- two individuals made on  twenty- five occasions. These included:
 anti- war MPs such as Thomas Richardson, R. C. Trevelyan and Ramsay
Macdonald; prominent ILP leaders such as R. C. Wallhead and E. P.
Wake; trade union leaders such as Tom Mann and Robert Williams; and
 anti- war activists such as Sylvia Pankhurst. Local figures included
prominent members of the NCF and the ILP, and some of the ‘advanced
men’ in the SWMF. The list included the increasingly  anti- war president
of the SWMF, James Winstone, and activists such as Noah Tromans,
George Dolling, Arthur Horner and W. H. Mainwaring, as well as the
increasingly influential ILP organizer for south Wales, Minnie Pallister.
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In only two cases in this period was a prosecution brought forward, and
bothwere against the ILPpropagandist and futureMP forMerthyrTydfil,
R. C.Wallhead.88 The extraordinarily high refusal rate of over ninety per
cent of Lindsay’s requests for prosecution in the period between January
and November 1917 stands in stark contrast with the preceeding period,
suggesting a dramatic reduction inLindsay’s influence.89 Indeed, from the
middle of 1916 onwards all proposals for prosecutions had to be referred
to the regional military command, which for Wales was the army
headquarters at Chester, rather than by local commands in the Cardiff
area.90 The competent military authority would then forward its
recommendations to MI5 and its Director, Colonel Vernon Kell, who
provided the analysis of the submissions and coordinated a response with
the Home Office, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and other
intelligence departments.91 Lindsay found the new arrangement
exceedingly frustrating, and as early as January 1917 complained that his
reports to theHomeOfficewere being kept formonthswithout reply;even
then,his applications for prosecutionswere routinely refused.
In February 1917 concern at Lindsay’s bellicosity caused the Home
Office’s  Under- Secretary of State, Sir Edward Troup, to commission the
Inspector of Constabulary, Sir Leonard Dunning, to investigate
Lindsay’s complaints. Dunning supported Lindsay and warned that if
firm steps were not taken against disloyalty, then lawlessness would
become as great a problem in south Wales as across the Irish Sea:92
Captain Lindsay, whatever his faults may be, has the knack of picking up
information of what is passing in the minds of many classes of his people
. . . In discussing the matter with me Captain Lindsay drew a parallel
between the state of affairs in Glamorgan and Ireland. He is an Irishman
and still closely connected with that country and my experience of it
makes me agree with him that a policy of overlooking offences against
the law has not produced good effects upon the public peace there, and
may be expected to produce similar effects on a county like Glamorgan
whose people in so many respects resemble the people of Ireland.93
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Comparing the situation in south Wales with the recent armed Easter
Rising in April 1916 was clearly contentious, but it underlines the high
degree of apprehension over industrial discontent and  anti- war
subversion in south Wales, and especially in Glamorgan. In November
1917, Lindsay sought to embarrass the Home Office by planting
questions in the House of Commons with Charles (Clem) Edwards, the
Liberal MP for East Glamorgan. On Lindsay’s own admission, the issue
of cases put forward for prosecution had ‘cropped up in a conversation’
with Edwards. In response to the Home Office’s irate enquiries, Lindsay
responded acerbically that the information could hardly be news to them
as it had been a subject of continual discussion by the public and the
press in the district for the past two years.94
This intervention was hardly contrived to improve the relationship
between the chief constable and the Home Office, but it suggests that
Lindsay regarded his local role as unassailable.95 He alleged to the Home
Office that the lack of action against disloyal elements meant that the
efforts of the recruiting authorities had been thwarted, the traffic of the
railways had been constantly endangered and the question on
everybody’s lips was ‘What are the police doing?’. A failure to secure
agreement to prosecute A. J. Cook, one of the leading  anti- war activists,
and a ‘seditionmonger’, was, he stated, ‘criminal’,96 and he warned that
‘huge public meetings, at which disloyalty is openly preached, cannot
pass without notice when vital interests are at stake’.97 He argued that
the loyal majority of the population would become disheartened if
nothing was done about this ‘disloyal minority’, and that had repressive
measures been more in use he was sure that ‘all signs of disloyalty in the
Admiralty steam coalfield would have disappeared’.98
In an alarming report to the Home Office on conditions in south
Wales in February 1918, Sir Leonard Dunning concluded that ‘the
situation in Glamorgan, Carmarthenshire and Monmouthshire is highly
discouraging. There is an active Socialist and pacifist party, a minority
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probably, but they do all the shouting.’ 99 Lindsay alleged to Dunning
that his efforts to prosecute  anti- war activists were hampered by two men
in particular, namely D. Lleufer Thomas and William Llewellyn
Williams, MP for East Carmarthenshire. Thomas was an advocate of
cooperation and adult education and in his capacity as stipendiary
magistrate for the Pontypridd and Rhondda area had witnessed
Lindsay’s methods at first hand during the Cambrian Combine Strike of
1910.100 In June 1917, as chairman of the Wales panel of the
Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest in Wales, his authoritative
report painted a ‘sombre picture of mounting tension throughout the
coalfield’.101 W. Llewellyn Williams MP, the Recorder for Cardiff,
opposed conscription and had thus fallen out with Lloyd George. He
appeared frequently as a defence solicitor on behalf of  anti- war
protestors and conscientious objectors throughout the war.102
In his frustration, Lindsay applied to the Home Office in December
1917 for a grant to help pay the cost of employing shorthand writers to
transcribe pacifist speeches which were being reported to him by his
police officers. He complained that ‘not surprisingly’ given the low rate of
prosecution, his police authority voiced dissatisfaction about paying the
costs of transcribing speeches that were not leading to prosecutions. The
Home Office thought Lindsay alarmist and took the rather more
sanguine view that ‘inflammatory language in South Wales would have
little effect on the rest of the country’.103
Lindsay attempted to  re- gain his ability to initiate his own
prosecutions but the Home Office refused: ‘I am afraid that if Captain
Lionel Lindsay be left a free hand, he will be likely to spend a good deal
of time on unnecessary cases. Some check should be kept on him.’104
Lindsay did not let up in his pursuit of what he viewed as the growing
subversive elements in the labour movement in south Wales, which had
its roots in the syndicalism he had attempted to combat before the war. A
week after the end of the war, a joint report was presented by Lindsay
and the army authorities in Chester which warned of growing socialist
agitation and the need for active  counter- propaganda in south Wales:
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Ablett and his kind are undoubtedly gaining ground amongst the
working classes of South Wales, especially in those districts that have the
reputation of being socialistic and ‘storm centres’ of agitation, disputes
and stoppages of work. These centres badly need some strong  counter-
 propaganda. The people are absorbing the doctrines of men like Ablett
for lack of speakers who will put before them the truth and some prac-
tical teaching on Social reform and the betterment of conditions of life
for workers and how these objects can be attained.105
An indication of the government’s anxiety about the dangers of industrial
and political discontent was the establishment of the Commission of
Enquiry into Industrial Unrest in June 1917. In that month, a ‘William
Randall’ offered to give evidence to the Wales division of the
Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest, and identified himself as
having worked for Admiralty Intelligence in south Wales investigating
labour unrest and ‘certain  anti- war movements’ from the summer of
1915 to the end of 1916.106
Randall was a trained accountant who had worked for trade protection
societies, which, as Hiley suggests, were a useful source of information
and personnel for the intelligence services.107 Randall initially wrote to
the secretary of the overall Commission of Enquiry into Industrial
Unrest, G. M. Hodgkin, who forwarded his letter to Edgar Chappell, the
secretary of the Commission Enquiry in Wales. As his references, he gave
the Director of Intelligence at the Admiralty, Captain Reginald ‘Blinker’
Hall, and the Assistant Commissioner at the head of the Special Branch
at Scotland Yard, Basil Thomson. There is no record in Edgar Chappell’s
papers that his request to the Admiralty for verification of Randall’s
credentials and for copies of his reports received a response, but in their
correspondence Chappell seemed to accept Randall’s credentials as an
intelligence officer. In a subsequent letter, he introduced himself as a
Special Service Officer in the War Staff of the Intelligence Division of the
Admiralty, who had been based in Cardiff from July 1915 to 31
December 1916, and stated that he had spent a considerable time in
south Wales, that he had a permanent address there throughout 1916,
and had made Cardiff his headquarters. He stated that he was in a
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position to give evidence on the difficulties of loyal trade union officials
and the influence of local extremists, on organizations of employers and
the bad effects of certain  ill- considered decisions of the coal owners’
association, on the effect of profiteering, the operation of the Military
Service Acts, and what he described as the ‘unwise and unnecessary
restriction of liberty’.
He stated his wish to give information about ‘the influences of
Syndicalism, Extreme Socialism and several  anti- war movements’ and
his readiness to ‘make suggestions and recommendation of remedial
measures of a permanent character’. 108 In a further letter to Chappell,
dated 26 June, he vented his anger at the intelligence authorities’
handling of industrial unrest in south Wales and contended that it had
been provoked and aggravated by ‘the unwise procedure originated or
countenanced by certain Government departments – for instance the
Intelligence Department of the War Office, known as MI5’.109 He
explained he had been engaged principally in the investigation of labour
unrest and the effect of  anti- war and other revolutionary influences in
organized labour, and he wished the Commission to have more than a
hundred of his reports dealing with labour matters and revolutionary
movements in south Wales, including reports of threatened strikes by
miners and railway men, and movements in these industries for wage
increases.
Randall’s letters are querulous in tone. He alleged that Chappell’s
insistence that he furnish a written statement, and his offer of only a
 third- class train fare and a sum for  out- of- pocket expenses, was ‘another
studied snub to further your very obvious desire that I shall not give
evidence’.110 He was not called as a witness, but the timescale for
receiving evidence and the preparation of the report was little more than
three weeks. A further concern for the panel and for Chappell may have
been the toxic and controversial nature of Randall’s comments. The
secretary to the Enquiry had written to each of the regional secretaries
on 26 June 1917 requesting them to ensure that the commissioners did
everything in their power to avoid making any information public that
might be of use to the enemy. He warned that the commissioners should
exercise the utmost caution in making statements to the press, and that
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the minutes of evidence or other documents ‘that could assist the enemy’
should be taken by the secretaries to the Commission and kept in safe
custody.111 In this febrile atmosphere it was inevitable that controversial
and contentious views emanating from intelligence sources were difficult
to manage in the context of a report that in its warnings of serious
industrial and social unrest was to be the most ‘remarkable’ and
‘exceptional’ of the regional reports published as part of the
Commission’s findings.112
The end of the war did not see a reduction in surveillance. An internal
report by the security services in April 1919 asserted that pacifism and
revolutionary socialism were intertwined in a subversive alliance to
undermine the state, and it identified the threat of political and industrial
unrest as emanating from the revolutionary left. Its definition of the
‘socialist movement’ was extremely broad, ranging from Christian
Socialism and the ILP to Marxian socialism, and it included elements of
the influence of syndicalism, anarchism and Bolshevism. It ascribed the
growth of the left to the influence of the Russian Revolution, the wider
effects of the war, the influence of the Central Labour College and the
Plebs’ League on the trade union movement. It highlighted the role of
 thirty- nine ‘prominent agitators’, including four from Wales: Noah
Ablett, A. J. Cook, W. H. Mainwaring and Robert Williams. Ablett, at the
time a miners’ agent in Merthyr, was described as a  ‘well- known Socialist
agitator and avowed Bolshevik. Has endeavoured to stop the war by
preventing recruiting and urges a revolution.’ Cook, from Trehafod in
the Rhondda, was described as a ‘revolutionary’, who took a prominent
part in agitation and was said to consider the police as ‘deadly
enemies’.113 W. H. Mainwaring, from Clydach Vale in the Rhondda, a
leader of the Rhondda syndicalist Unofficial Reform Committee, local
secretary of the NCF and a member of the ILP, was described as an
‘extreme socialist’ who advocated a general strike during the submarine
blockade in 1917 and was a supporter of the Russian Revolution. Robert
Williams from Swansea, a former docker and the influential general
secretary of the National Transport Workers’ Federation, was described
as a  ‘pro- Bolshevist, conscientious objector, protected by official
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position; revolutionary socialist; republican, a member of the ILP
(Independent Labour Party), UDC (Union of Democratic Control),
BSP (British Socialist Party) and NCCL’.114 Mounting concern about
the growing influence of the left in the labour movement and its
symbiotic relationship with the  anti- war movement explains to a large
extent why the security services became increasingly active against the
left from the spring of 1916 onwards, and the perceived threat of
Bolshevism ensured that the security services continued their activity
after the end of the war in order to combat the perceived threat of
peacetime subversion.
This article provides an insight into how different branches of the
State’s intelligence services operated in the regional context of south
Wales during the Great War. From early 1916 onwards, the intelligence
services had shifted their emphasis from  counter- espionage to  counter-
 subversion.115 The responsibility for the identification and increased
monitoring of activists in the peace and labour movements during the
war was distributed amongst a plethora of government departments,
especially PMS2, Special Branch, and MI5. MI5’s caution in pursuing
 anti- war activists, and in discouraging public conflict, as in the aftermath
of the Cory Hall disturbance, was in sharp contrast to Lindsay’s
boisterous and relentless persecution of individuals such as T. E.
Nicholas. The deteriorating relationship between the Glamorgan Chief
Constable, the Home Office, and MI5 reflects the diminishing power of
local police forces and the corresponding centralization of authority over
security issues by MI5 and Special Branch. Lee’s meetings with Lloyd
George’s closest staff in November 1916 suggest an extremely close and
symbiotic relationship which led to the effective manipulation of
newspaper coverage about industrial and economic conditions in the
coal industry and the strengthening of the  pro- war campaign in south
Wales in 1917, whilst also recognizing the serious social and economic
issues that fermented industrial and political dissent. PMS2 was closed
in June 1917, however, following the involvement of one of its agents as
an agent provocateur in a plot to murder Lloyd George, but its staff was
returned to MI5, and its case files were sent to Special Branch.116 This
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presaged the consolidation of the domestic security services into a single
intelligence organization in 1919 under the command of the Special
Branch’s Basil Thomson, who became Director of Intelligence.117 By the
end of the war, the security services had themselves  re- defined their roles
to such an extent that the investigation and monitoring of any person or
organization considered to be subversive was permitted. The perceived
threat of Bolshevism dominated the concerns of the security services
after the war, and in south Wales social and economic dislocation, the
growth of Labour and greater militancy in the mining industry did little
to allay their concern.
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